



IoT: Internet of Things, or Internet of Threats

Garrick Ng


Cyber Security Professionals Awards – Gold Winner

SCC Security SIG Chairman

Chief Technology Officer

Cisco Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan

April 2017



Internet of Things (IoT)

GS1

Consumer IoT

Enterprise IoT

Industrial IoT

Consumer IoT

- These devices are highly constrained in terms of
 - Physical size, Inexpensive
 - CPU power, Memory, Bandwidth
 - Autonomous operation in the field
- Power consumption is critical
 - If it is battery powered then energy efficiency is paramount, batteries might have to last for years
- Some level of remote management is required
- Value often linked to a Cloud platform or Service



Ransomware Infects Smart TV

THE FBI
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FBI HEADQUARTERS

WASHINGTON, DC DEPARTMENT, USA

WASHINGTON, DC DEPARTMENT, USA

WASHINGTON, DC DEPARTMENT, USA

AS A RESULT OF FULL SCANNING OF YOUR DEVICE, SOME SUSPICIOUS FILES HAVE BEEN FOUND AND YOUR ATTENDANCE OF THE FORBIDDEN PORNOGRAPHIC SITES HAS BEEN FIXED. FOR THIS REASON YOUR DEVICE HAS BEEN LOCKED.

INFORMATION ON YOUR LOCATION AND SNAPSHOTS CONTAINING YOUR FACE HAVE BEEN UPLOADED ON THE FBI CYBER CRIME DEPARTMENT'S DATACENTER.

FIRST OF ALL, FAMILIARISE WITH THE POSITIONS STATED IN SECTION «THE LEGAL BASIS OF VIOLATIONS». ACCORDING TO THESE POSITIONS YOUR ACTIONS BEAR CRIMINAL CHARACTER AND YOU ARE A CRIMINAL SUBJECT. THE PENALTY AS A BASE MEASURE OF PUNISHMENT ON YOU WHICH YOU ARE OBLIGED TO PAY IN A CURRENT OF THREE CALENDAR DAYS IS IMPOSED.

THE SIZE OF THE PENALTY IS \$500.00

ATTENTION!
DISCONNECTION OR DISPOSAL OF THE DEVICE OR YOUR ATTEMPTS TO UNLOCK THE DEVICE INDEPENDENTLY WILL BE APPREHENDED AS UNAPPROVED ACTIONS INTERFERING THE EXECUTION OF THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (READ SECTION 1509 - OBSTRUCTION OF COURT ORDERS AND SECTION 1510 - OBSTRUCTION OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS) IN THIS CASE AND IN CASE OF PENALTY NON-PAYMENT IN A CURRENT OF THREE CALENDAR DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THIS NOTIFICATION, THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF PENALTY WILL BE TRIPLED AND THE RESPECTIVE FINES WILL BE CHARGED TO THE OUTSTANDING PENALTY IN CASE OF DISSENT WITH THE INDICTED PROSECUTION, YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO CHALLENGE IT IN COURT.

TO MAKE A PENALTY PAYMENT, GO TO SECTION «PAYMENT PENALTIES»




DIRECTOR JAMES COMEY
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
935 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, DC 20535-0001



A target can become a weapon



DDoS attack to Dyn 2016.10



United States
of America

Bermuda

BBC, CNN, CNBC, NY Times, Twitter, Netflix, Paypal, Amazon, PlayStation, xBox, ...

1.2Tbps from 100,000 IoT devices



Bahamas


Cuba

Turks and Caicos
Islands

Enterprise IoT



29,000 printers in dozens of college campuses across US




“I probe around for a multifunction printer and see that it is configured with default passwords. Great I am in”

“YES! We've compromised a number of companies using printers as our initial foothold.....”

.....Hackers Playbook by Peter Kim.




San Francisco MUNI Railway, 900 computer encrypted, demand for \$73,000



Information Theft

Physical Damage



Insulin Pump (Human SCADA System)




Barnaby Jack



Hacked Jeep

Commercial Buildings Digitization

Enterprise IoT (EIoT)



Lighting

HVAC


Energy/Metering

Physical Security

Inventory

Sensors

Appliances



Cisco Smart & Connected Real Estate












DDoS attack to BAS takes down heating system to 2 buildings (Lappeenranta, Finland)

Nov 2016


A city street scene at sunset, featuring modern buildings and a double-decker bus. The sky is a warm orange color, and the buildings are silhouetted against it. A double-decker bus is visible in the foreground, and a sign for 'BUNHOF ROTSDAMER PLATZ' is visible on the right. The overall atmosphere is warm and urban.

Industrial IoT Industrial Control Systems

Assets We need to Protect

	Asset	Description	Examples and Notes
	IEDs	Intelligent Electronic Device – Commonly used within a control system, and is equipped with a small microprocessor to communicate digitally.	Sensor, actuator, motor, transformer, circuit breaker, pump
	RTUs	Remote Terminal Unit – Typically used in a substation or remote location. It monitors field parameters and transmit data back to central station.	Overlap with PLC in terms of capability and functionality
	PLCs	Programmable Logic Controller – A specialized computer used to automate control functions within industrial network.	Most PLCs do not use commercial OS, and use “ladder logic” for control functions
	HMIs	Human Machine Interfaces – Operator’s dashboard or control panel to monitor and control PLCs, RTUs, and IEDs.	HMIs are typically modern control software running on modern operating systems (e.g. Windows).
	Supervisory Workstations	Collect information from industrial assets and present the information for supervisory purposes.	Unlike HMI, a supervisory workstation is primarily read-only.
	Data Historians	Software system that collects point values and other information from industrial devices and store them in specialized database.	Typically with built-in high availability and replicated across the industrial network.
	Other Assets	Many other devices may be connected to an industrial network.	For example, printers can be connected directly to a control loop.

OT Network Security



AIR GAP

Airgap Security Quotes

"In our experience in conducting hundreds of vulnerability assessments in the private sector, in no case have we ever found the operations network, the SCADA system or energy management system separated from the enterprise network. On average, **we see 11 direct connections** between those networks. In some extreme cases, we have identified up to 250 connections between the actual producing network and the enterprise network."

Source: The Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense, and Foreign Operations May 25, 2011 hearing




BTC Oil Pipeline




Iran Natanz Nuclear Facility ... Stuxnet

Target ICS Infrastructure – Iran's Natanz Nuclear Facilities



Physical attack mechanism

1. Measures and records rotation frequency for 13 days
 - Expected range : 800hz to 1000hz
2. Accelerate rotation frequency to 1400hz for 15 minutes
3. Sleep for 27 days
4. Slow rotation frequency to 2Hz for 50 minutes
5. Sleep for 27 days
6. Go to 2



International Space Station ISS

Impact in
Ukraine:

Power lose to
225K people for
1-6 hours

30 sub-stations
disconnected

INSIDE THE CUNNING, UNPRECEDENTED HACK OF UKRAINE'S POWER GRID



Ukraine Grid Attack – Chronology of Events


Spear phishing to gain business network access



Theft of Credentials



Remote operation of ICS Systems



KillDisk to erase MBR and delete targeted logs



Attack on IT Domain

Attack on OT Domain



BlackEnergy 3 malware installed



Use of VPNs to access ICS network



S2E devices compromised at firmware level



Power Outage




Northern Ukraine Power Grid, North substation in Kiev

IT and OT Technologies Convergence

Illustrative

IT – Info Tech OT Oper Tech



Note: IT & OT As Defined by IOT BU
 *OT Baseline Features

IT (Information Technology) Vs OT (Operation Technology)

Security Policies	IT Network	OT Network
Focus	Protecting Intellectual Property and Company Assets	24/7 Operations, High OEE, Safety, and Ease of Use
Priorities	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Confidentiality Integrity Availability 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Availability Integrity Confidentiality
Types of Data Traffic	Converged Network of Data, Voice and Video (Hierarchical)	Converged Network of Data, Control Protocols, Information, Safety and Motion (P2P & Hierarchical)
Implications of a Device Failure	Continues to Operate	Could Stop Processes, Impact Markets, Physical Harm
Threat Protection	Shut Down Access to Detected Threat and Remediate	Potentially Keep Operating with a Detected Threat
Upgrades and Patch Mgmt	ASAP During Uptime	Scheduled During Downtime
Infrastructure Life Cycle	Equipment upgrades and refresh <5yr	Avoid Equipment upgrades (lifespan 15+ yrs)
Deployment conditions	Controlled physical environments	Harsh environments (temp, vibration, etc)

IT/OT Converged Security Model

Cloud	OT Partners & Services	Cloud-based Threat Protection	Availability Integrity Confidentiality Identity Mgmt & Access Control Threat Detection & Mitigation
Internet		Network-wide Policy Enforcement	
IT	Enterprise Network	Enterprise Edge (VPN, IPS, NGFW)	
		Anti-Virus	
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone	Corporate Directory	
		Plant Edge (VPN, IPS & Remote Access)	
		Stateful Firewall	
OT	Process, Supervisory	Access Control	
		SIEM, Remote Services Platform	
	Control, Automation	OT Policy Mgmt, SW, Config, AV & Asset Mgmt.	
		Cyber & Physical Access Control Systems	
		Ruggedized Firewall	
		Ruggedized IDS / IPS	
		Segmentation: VLANs, VRFs, ACLs	

IoT Enabler - Cisco Connectivity Fabric



Cisco
IoT
System

Industrial Switching



IE 1K, 2K,3K,4K,5K,
CGS

Industrial Routing



IR 809/829,IR 509

CGR 1000



CGR 2000

LoRa GW



IR809
GW

IR829 3-sector
GW

Network Management



FND, IND,IOT-DM, IOK,
IOX/Fog Director

Industrial Wireless



IW 3700, 1552H

Industrial Security



ISA 3000

Embedded Networks



ESS, 5900 ESR
5921 SW ESR

Cisco IoT System Network Connectivity

IoT Network as a Sensor and Enforcer

IE Switches, IR Routers, ISE

High performance, H/W accelerated VPN – IR 809, 829

Portfolio wide consistent policy enforcement

Attack and abnormal traffic detection mitigation

Misconfiguration prevention

MAC Bypass for legacy device identification

DDOS attack mitigation

Industrial Switching



IE 2000, 3000
CGS2000



IP67



IE 4000



IE 5000

Industrial Routing



IR 829



IR 809

Simplified
Compliance

Risk
Mitigation

Consistent Policy
Enforcement

Increased System
Availability

Industrial Security - ISA 3000

ISA 3000 Fibre



ISA 3000 Copper




- Industrial, Energy, Marine, Railway Compliance
- Services include Firewall, VPN and SourceFire IPS, DHCP, and NAT
- Two Configurations
 - Copper: 4x10/100/1000BaseT; 2x10/100/1000BaseT
 - Fibre: 2x1GbE (SFP)
 - LED scheme is OT Ready



- DIN Rail mounting with optional Rack Mounting
- Connectors: Management Interface (RJ45 and USB); Power supports 24-12 AWG; Factory Reset
- Thermals: -40C to 60C no airflow; -40C to 70C with 40LFM; -34C to 74C with 200LFM

Cisco Threat Centric Security Model



Threat Centric model to cover the Entire Attack Continuum



DNS Layer Protection & CASB

Firewall

VPN

NGIPS

Cognitive Threat Analytics (CTA)

NGFW

UTM

Email & Web Security


Network Behavior Analysis

Secure Access + Identity Services

Advanced Malware Protection (AMP) & Threat Grid (Sandbox)


Visibility, Context, Segmentation & Threat Intelligence

Automatic remediation with ISE and TrustSec




Network Traffic Visibility – Behavior & Anomaly Detection


- Comprised Credential, Insider Threat, Suspicious Activities through Netflow



Collect & Analyze Flows




Establish Baseline of Behaviors



Alarm on Anomalies & Changes in Behavior


IT/OT Converged Security Model – Manufacturing

**Enterprise Network
Levels 4–5**




**Cloud-based Threat Protection
Network-wide Policy Enforcement
Access Control (application-level)**

**Demilitarized Zone
Level 3.5**




**VPN & Remote Access Services
Next-Generation Firewall
Intrusion Prevention (IPS)**

**Manufacturing Zone
Level 3**



**Stateful Firewall
Intrusion Protection/Detection (IPS/IDS)
Physical Access Control Systems**


**Cell/Area Zone
Levels 0–2**



**Ruggedized Firewall
Ruggedized Intrusion Protection (IDS)
Remote Monitoring / Surveillance
SW, Config & Asset Mgmt**


CPwE 3.5 Overall Architecture with Wireless

- Wide Area Network (WAN)
- Physical or Virtualised Servers
- ERP, Email
- Active Directory (AD), AAA – Radius
- Call Manager, etc.



Enterprise/IT Integration
 Collaboration
 Wireless
 Application Optimisation
Enterprise Zone Levels 4 - 5

- Patch Management
- Remote Desktop Gateway Server
- Data Share
- Cisco Video Surveillance Data Share
- Application Mirror
- AV Server




- Plant Firewalls:
- Inter-zone traffic segmentation
 - ACLs, IPS and IDS
 - VPN Services – Remote Site Access
 - Portal and Remote Desktop Services proxy

Application and Data share
 Access Control
 Threat Protection

Industrial Demilitarised Zone


- FactoryTalk AssetCentre
- FactoryTalk View Server, Clients & View Studio
- FactoryTalk Batch
- FactoryTalk Historian
- RSLinx Enterprise
- FactoryTalk Security Server
- Cisco Video Surveillance Manager
- 1588 Precision Time Protocol Service
- Active Directory Federated Services
- Remote Access Server
- Studio 5000




Level 3
 Site Operations
 Multi-Service Networks
 Network and Security Management
 Routing

Industrial Zone


Real-Time Control
 Fast Convergence
 Traffic Segmentation and Management



Industrial Wired LAN Access supported in CPwE baseline



Industrial Wired LAN Access Configurations Introduced w/ CPwE - REP



Industrial Wireless LAN CPWE 3.5.0

In Summary

- Threat on IoT is real
- Industrial Networking
 - Convergence, IP everywhere, Focus on security
- Cyber Security
 - Beyond Air Gap
 - Before - During – After Security Model
 - Wired and Wireless Considerations
 - Follow Best Practices





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